All Intensive Purposes

In The One Percent Doctrine, Ron Suskind's CIA sources describe Abu Zabaydah's "insanity" and "limited role" in al Qaeda. Bush touted his capture and ordered him tortured so he wouldn't "lose face":

. . . Bush . . . [gave] a speech at the Greenwich, Connecticut, Hyatt Regency on April 9, 2002. "The other day we hauled in a guy named Abu Zubaydah. He's one of the top operatives plotting and planning death and destruction on the United States. He's not plotting and planning anymore. He's where he belongs," the President said to raucous cheers from a roomful of Republican Party contributors. . . .

. . . [T]he characterizing of Zubaydah as the "chief of operations" for all of al Qaeda, a putative "number three" to bin Laden and Zawahiri -- would be a drum the President, the Vice President, national security advisor Condoleeza Rice, and others would beat relentlessly that April and [in] the months to follow.

Meanwhile, Dan Coleman and other knowledgeable members of the tribe of al Qaeda hunters at CIA were reading Zubaydah's top secret diary and shaking their heads.

"This guy is insane, certifiable, split personality," Coleman told a top official after a few days reviewing the Zubaydah haul. "That's why they let him fly all over the world doing meet and greet. That's why people used his name on all sorts of calls and e-mails. He was like a travel agent, the guy who booked your flights. . . . He was expendable, you know, the greeter . . . Joe Louis in the lobby of Caeser's Palace, shaking hands."

This opinion was echoed at the top of CIA and was, of course, briefed to the President and Vice President. While Bush was out in public claiming Zubaydah's grandiose malevolence, his private disappointment fell, as it often would, on Tenet . . . .

"I said he was important," Bush said to Tenet at one of their daily meetings. "You're not going to let me lose face on this, are you?"

"No sir, Mr. President."

Back in Langley, Tenet pressed subordinates over what could be done to get Zubaydah to talk. His injuries were serious . . . .

"He received the finest medical attention on the planet," said one CIA official. "We got him in very good health, so we could start to torture him." . . .

. . . [T]he value of his capture had been oversold to the American public; and Zubaydah wouldn't talk. Tenet was pushing his staff at CIA for a surprise, a breakthrough, which he could then deliver to Bush -- evidence that would, after the fact, support the President's public statements. . . .

"Around the room a lot of people just rolled their eyes when we heard comments from the White House. I mean, Bush and Cheney knew what we knew about Zubaydah. The guy had psychological issues. He was, in a way, expendable. It was like calling someone who runs a company's in-house travel department the COO," said one top CIA official, who attended the 5 p.m. meeting where the issue of Zubaydah came up. "The thinking was, why the hell did the President have to put us in a box like this?"

. . . [T]his was the President's management style. A way, as he would often quip, to push people "to do things they didn't think they were capable of." (99-101)

* * * * *

. . . Zubaydah now recovered, it was time, in May of 2002, to test boundaries.

According to CIA sources, he was water-boarded, a technique in which a captive's face is covered with a towel as water is poured atop, creating the sensation of drowning. He was beaten, though not in a way to worsen his injuries. He was repeatedly threatened, and made certain of his impending death. His medication was withheld. He was bombarded with deafening, continuous noise and harsh lights. He was a man already diminished by serious injuries, more fully at the mercy of interrogators than an ordinary prisoner. (115)

* * * * *

Meanwhile, Zubaydah was still talking -- maybe nonsense, maybe not. There was almost no way to tell. (118)

* * * * *

[I]n the grit of the fight itself, Bush makes it personal. . . . He was fixated on how to get Zubaydah to tell us the truth -- "Do some of these harsh methods really work?" he asked one briefer . . . . (152)

* * * * *

. . . the springtime's bewilderment about the overstating of the Zubaydah capture. That one, however, was more easily managed: knowledge of Zubaydah's limited role in al Qaeda, and apparent insanity, was closely held and deeply classified. (169)

President Bush, today:

Within months of September the 11th, 2001, we captured a man known as Abu Zubaydah. We believe that Zubaydah was a senior terrorist leader and a trusted associate of Osama bin Laden. . . .

After he recovered, Zubaydah was defiant and evasive. He declared his hatred of America. During questioning, he at first disclosed what he thought was nominal information -- and then stopped all cooperation. . . .

We knew that Zubaydah had more information that could save innocent lives, but he stopped talking. As his questioning proceeded, it became clear that he had received training on how to resist interrogation. And so the CIA used an alternative set of procedures. . . .

I want to be absolutely clear with our people, and the world: The United States does not torture. It's against our laws, and it's against our values. I have not authorized it -- and I will not authorize it.

Someone is lying.